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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
Nos. 15-3194 & 16-1305 
___________ 
 
ARVIND GUPTA, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
SECRETARY UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR;  
WIPRO LIMITED 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the  District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 3-14-cv-04054) 
District Judge:  Honorable Freda L. Wolfson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
April 28, 2016 
 
Before:  FUENTES, KRAUSE and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  May 5, 2016) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Arvind Gupta appeals from orders of the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey granting the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, denying 
his motion for reconsideration, and denying his motion for costs and expenses.  Because 
these appeals do not present a substantial question, we will summarily affirm.  See 3d 
Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
 The parties are familiar with the facts, which are thoroughly set forth in the 
District Court’s Opinion, so we will only briefly revisit them here.  In 2003, Gupta, a 
citizen of India, entered the United States to work for Wipro, Ltd., as an H-1B worker, 
pursuant to a labor condition application that had been approved by the Department of 
Labor.  See Cyberworld Enter. Techs., Inc. v. Napolitano, 602 F.3d 189, 192 (3d Cir. 
2010) (noting that “to obtain H-1B visas for their employees, employers must file a ‘labor 
condition application’ (‘LCA’) with the Department of Labor under procedures set forth 
by 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)”).  The H-1B program is designed to allow professionals from 
other countries who are employed in “specialty occupations” to work in the United States 
on a temporary basis.  Id.  Gupta worked for Wipro until March 17, 2006, and then again 
briefly in March 2008.  Thereafter, Gupta attempted to start a recruiting business with 
offices in the United States and India, but he “abandoned the business idea later.”  
 In May and June 2009, Gupta filed complaints with the Department of Labor’s 
Wage and Hour Division, alleging that Wipro took unauthorized deductions from his 
wages and from the wages of other workers.  The Administrator of the Wage and Hour 
Division found no reasonable cause to investigate the complaint.  Gupta requested a 
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hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who ultimately found “that summary 
decision in favor of the Administrator is appropriate” and dismissed Gupta’s complaint.  
Gupta next filed a petition for review with the Administrative Review Board (ARB), 
which affirmed the ALJ’s dismissal of his complaint.  In particular, the ARB concluded 
that Gupta’s claims of H-1B violations pertaining to his wages were time-barred, that he 
was not eligible to file a complaint on behalf of other Wipro employees as an aggrieved 
competitor because he did not start his own business, and that he could not appeal from 
the Administrator’s discretionary rejection of his request to investigate “credible source” 
complaints.    
 In March 2014, Gupta filed in the District Court a pro se complaint under the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) against Wipro and the Secretary of Labor.1  See 5 
U.S.C. § 702.  Wipro and the Secretary of Labor filed motions for summary judgment, 
which the District Court granted.  Gupta filed a timely motion for reconsideration, which 
the District Court denied.  Gupta appealed, and the matter was docketed here at C.A. No. 
15-3194.  Gupta also appealed from a later order denying his motion for costs and 
expenses; that matter was docketed here at C.A. No. 16-1305.  Gupta and Wipro have 
filed cross-motions for summary action in both appeals. 
                                              
1 Gupta initially filed the complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of California, which, upon Wipro’s motion (which was joined by the Secretary of 
Labor), transferred the matter to the District of New Jersey.  To the extent that Gupta 
seeks review of that transfer order, we lack jurisdiction.  See Posnanski v. Gibney, 421 
F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that “a transfer order issued by a district court in 
another circuit” is “reviewable only in the circuit of the transferor district court.”).   
4 
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 5 U.S.C. § 702, and we have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  In reviewing final administrative decisions under the APA, “we 
review the district court’s summary judgment decision de novo, while ‘applying the 
appropriate standard of review to the agency’s decision.’”  Concerned Citizens Alliance, 
Inc. v. Slater, 176 F.3d 686, 693 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Sierra Club v. Slater, 120 F.3d 
623, 632 (6th Cir. 1997)).  Under the APA, we review agency actions to determine 
whether they were “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law[.]”  5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).  “The scope of review under the ‘arbitrary 
and capricious’ standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of 
the agency.”  Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).  We must determine only “whether the decision was based 
on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of 
judgment.”  Id. (quotations and citations omitted).   
 Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 655.806(a), “[a]ny aggrieved party” under the H-1B visa 
program may file a complaint with the Wage and Hour Division pertaining to the 
enforcement of LCAs.  An aggrieved party includes, inter alia, a “worker” or 
“competitor” whose “operations or interests are adversely affected by the employer’s 
alleged non-compliance with the [LCA].”  20 C.F.R. § 655.715.  The Administrator of 
the Wage and Hour Division determines whether there is “reasonable cause to believe 
that a violation . . . has been committed, and therefore that an investigation is warranted.”  
20 C.F.R. § 655.806(a)(2).  Notably, “[n]o investigation or hearing shall be conducted on 
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a complaint . . . unless the complaint was filed not later than 12 months after the date of 
the failure or misrepresentation.”  8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(2)(A); see 20 C.F.R. 
§ 655.806(a)(5).   
 Gupta left his employment at Wipro in March 2006, and briefly worked for the 
company again in March 2008.  Therefore, the ARB properly concluded that Gupta’s 
complaints, filed in May and June 2009, were untimely to the extent that he sought relief 
on behalf of himself as an aggrieved worker.2  Gupta asserted that equitable tolling or 
equitable estoppel should excuse his untimely complaints because Wipro made him “sign 
a letter agreement, which included the unauthorized deduction as a condition of 
employment,” “did not provide earning statements . . . for several months,” and failed to 
inform him that the terms of the LCA would control the conditions of his employment.  
We conclude that, even if the 12-month limitation period is subject to tolling, the ARB’s 
affirmance of the ALJ’s rejection of Gupta’s argument was not arbitrary or capricious 
because Gupta failed to adequately explain how Wipro’s conduct induced him not to file 
his complaints within the limitations period.  See Sch. Dist. of Allentown v. Marshall, 
657 F.2d 16, 19-20 (3d Cir. 1981) (noting that equitable tolling is appropriate when, inter 
alia, “the defendant has actively misled the plaintiff respecting the cause of action . . . .” 
                                              
2 Furthermore, the ARB properly concluded that Gupta could not proceed as an aggrieved 
competitor.  In the course of attempting to start a recruiting business, Gupta acquired a 
June 2009 pay statement from a then-current Wipro employee.  According to Gupta, that 
pay statement provided a basis upon which to file a timely complaint as Wipro’s 
competitor.  But because, by his own admission, Gupta never started a business that 
competed with Wipro, the ARB’s conclusion that he did not qualify as an aggrieved 
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(quoting Smith v. Am. President Lines, Ltd., 571 F.2d 102, 109 (2d Cir. 1978)).  We also 
agree that Wipro raised a timeliness defense at the first reasonably possible moment after 
being notified of the proceedings, and that Gupta had an adequate opportunity to 
demonstrate why the timeliness defense should not succeed.3  Cf. Robinson v. Johnson, 
313 F.3d 128, 135-36 (3d Cir. 2002).   
 Gupta’s remaining claims lack merit, substantially for the reasons provided in the 
District Court’s thorough opinion.  In an apparent effort to avoid application of 12-month 
limitations period, Gupta sought to bypass the administrative review process completely 
by raising his claims directly in the District Court.  We agree with the District Court, 
however, that no private right of action exists for violations of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n).  See, 
e.g., Venkatraman v. REI Sys., Inc., 417 F.3d 418, 422-24 (4th Cir. 2005) (concluding 
that there is no implied cause of action under § 1182(n)).  Gupta has provided no 
authority to the contrary.  In addition, although Gupta alleged that the ARB committed 
numerous procedural violations during the adjudication of his complaints, he failed to 
establish that he was deprived of due process.  See Ala. Power Co. v. FCC, 311 F.3d 
                                                                                                                                                 
competitor was not arbitrary or capricious.   
3 In November 2010, the ALJ issued an order directing the Administrator to show cause 
why s/he was not required to conduct an investigation based on Gupta’s complaints.  The 
Administrator filed a response in December 2010, alleging that Gupta “does not qualify 
as an aggrieved worker because any violations that may have been committed against 
him in that capacity happened more than twelve months before the submission of his 
complaint to the Wage and Hour” Division.  Administrative Record (A.R.), 68 (Dist. Ct. 
Doc. No. 70).  Wipro first received notice of the proceedings sometime after August 30, 
2011, and filed a response on November 4, 2011, stating that it agreed with the ALJ’s 
resolution of the matter.  A.R. 289-93, 374.   
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1357, 1367 (11th Cir. 2002) (“We review constitutional challenges to agency orders de 
novo.”).  In particular, the alleged violations were minor and would not have denied 
Gupta sufficient notice or a meaningful opportunity to respond.  There is also no merit to 
Gupta’s assertion that the ARB improperly construed his complaints as encompassing 
only a claim for unauthorized deductions, instead of also including an allegation that 
Wipro did not pay required wages.  It is clear, however, that Gupta’s complaints 
contained no challenge to wages paid by Wipro, and Gupta did not move to amend his 
complaints to include such a claim.  To the extent that Gupta sought review of the ARB’s 
decision to affirm the ALJ’s denial of his request to hear his complaint as a “credible 
source” under 20 C.F.R. § 655.807, we agree that the decision is unreviewable.  See 20 
C.F.R. § 655.807(h)(2) (providing that parties may not appeal from the Labor 
Department’s refusal to exercise discretion to investigate violations based on credible 
information received from reliable sources).  
 We further agree that Gupta’s motion for reconsideration did not involve an 
intervening change in controlling law, newly discovered evidence, or allegations of clear 
errors of law or fact.  See Max’s Seafood Café v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir. 
1999).  Finally, contrary to Gupta’s assertion, neither 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(2)(C)(i) nor 
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 35 (1991), provide for the award of costs and 
expenses in this circumstances.  Section 1182(n)(2)(C)(i) permits the Secretary of Labor 
to impose appropriate administrative remedies for violations of certain labor condition 
application requirements.  Chambers involved “scope of the inherent power of a federal 
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court to sanction a litigant for bad-faith conduct.”  501 U.S. at 35.  Because Gupta was 
not a prevailing party and has not alleged any bad-faith conduct, the District Court 
properly denied his motion for costs and expenses.    
 Accordingly, because there is no substantial question presented by these appeals, 
we grant Wipro’s motions to summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
Gupta’s motions for summary action are denied, as is his motion to strike Wipro’s motion 
for summary action in C.A. No. 15-3194.  
